




AN-1 code cipher は 日本海軍昭和 15 年度改版「D」暗号書に付随する乱数表。第 1 号は「乱数表第 6 号」、第 2 号は「乱数表第 7 号」、第 3 号は「乱数表第 8 号」を意味する。乱数表第 7 号はハワイ作戦実施前の乱数表、乱数表第 8 号は K 作戦を含むミッドウェー作戦時の乱数表。



函獲された文書が米軍解読班に貢献した内容を含む。JN25 暗号は「真珠湾参事」前に解読されたことを示す。



以前の鹵獲したした4数字暗号がヒントに JN25 暗号が解読されたことを示す。



戦後に解読されたと言われる JN25B 暗号の情報。機動部隊擄戦命令の内容は不明との内容。

TOP SECRET-ULTRA

(ed)

U MO 2 All Fleets.  
DE  
NA FU 6 TOKYO Radio  
- (SU) U W 22

From: SA SU 958 Cardivs, Comb Fleet, Chief of Staff.  
Action: TU HI 058 Comb. Fleet Chief of Staff  
Info: YA ME 88 NAFUTO C.O.

1700/November 19, 1941

(TOI 11/190059 G LF 4155 A) B

JN 25 B

*Serial* 840

NAFUTO (X 01734) was not included in the distribution of  
Striking Force OpOrd # 5. Please arrange for delivery of any pertinent parts  
of same.

GZ Comment: Note that Striking Force OpOrds (MKIREI SAKI) are all written  
operation orders and are not sent by dispatch, hence we have no way of knowing the  
contents.

JN 5

0041 Z

(JAPANESE)

(NK) Navy Trans 11/27/45

TOP SECRET-ULTRA

聯合艦隊司令長官山本五十六大將巡視電の解読。その電報は E-14、日本海軍波一暗号書、乱数表第二号を意味する。

in the scale of the two operations, they are in their way as significant. Throughout the last weeks of October and the first weeks of November, when victory was still hanging in the balance, an uninterrupted stream of intelligence from D-10 supplemented by JN#4, flowed out to the fleet. On 30 October the Communications Intelligence Unit received a commendation from Admiral King. It came at the end of a month of successes, of which the battles of Cape Esperance (11 October) and Santa Cruz (26 October) were the most outstanding. The crucial battle of Guadalcanal (13-14-15 November) resulted in a defeat costing the enemy 2 BB's, 4 CA's, 4 DD's and a number of transports, more than 20,000 Japanese troops losing their lives in the sinking of the convoy. The last major attempt to recapture the island had been broken. On 17 November the unit was commended by Admiral Himitz, and Admiral King appended a "Well Done".

Usage No. 1 was in effect from 15 August 1942 to 14 April 1943, and the period was marked by almost continuous decryption and increasingly speedy break-ins when ciphers changed. When Usage No. 2 went into effect on 15 April, JN#25 was to undergo a 37-day black-out, for Usage No. 2 was not to be as quickly solved as No. 1 had been. In view of this, the following E-14 despatch of two days before, 13 April, may be said to have been sent just in time:

To: Solomons Defense Force  
Air Group 204  
Air Flot 26  
Commander Ballale Garrison Force

From: CinC Southwest Area Fleet

On 16 April, CinC Combined Fleet will visit RXZ, R--, and RXP in accordance with the following schedule:

1. Depart RR at 0600 in a medium attack plane escorted by 6 fighters. Arrive RXZ at 0800. Proceed by minesweeper to R-- arriving at 0840.... Depart R-- at 0945 in above minesweeper and arrive RXZ at 1030. Depart RXZ at 1100 in medium attack plane and arrive at RXP at 1110. Depart RXP at

10